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I The Past and the Future
If we could agree about the past predicting the future would be much easier 
This paper attempts to look into the future of nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia but takes a substantial detour into the past I think this is essential 
because the subject is freighted down with myth and legend, and to the degree 
that the future will be a continuation of past developments we must 
understand where we came from in order to see where we might be going 
We will examine critical turning points of the past in sections II and in below
Our look into the future is complicated by factors other than disagreement 
about the past These include the highly classified nature of the relevant 
technologies,^ the presence of both misinformation^ and disinformation, and 
the complex, multi-layered nature of the subject—with key inputs found at 
the sub-national, national, regional, and global levels The following is 
intended to summarize much of my own understanding of how South Asia 
reached its present state of nuclear grace 3
II The Past Who Went First?
The Indian Debate
While Jawaharlal Nehru had left open the nuclear option by approving the 
construction of an enrichment facility, nuclear weapons were not seriously 
debated in India until 1964 The debate was ,triggered by the Chinese test of 
1964, this came after the humiliation of 1962, after Nehru s death, and during 
a period of unusual domestic unease This was the most mature and 
extended national security debate ever held m South Asia It raged m the 
press, in academia, within and between several political parties, and lasted 
over a year Briefly, Lai Bahadur Shastri (who was opposed to going nuclear) 
bought time by agreeing to the policy of holding the option open, 
continuing research, and approaching the superpowers for some kind of 
nuclear assurances against what was seen as a long-term threat from Beijing
This policy was bitterly opposed by some of Nehru s closest associates, 
especially V K Krishna Menon Menon opposed any development of nuclear 
weapons by India and spoke frequently, albeit with little impact, to that effect 
It is curious that now many of India s bomb advocates claim that Nehru 
would have wanted to go nuclear after the Chmese test Shastri s policies did 
placate these hawks, who wanted the country to plunge ahead into the full- 
scale development of nuclear weapons
As time passed it became clear that the Chinese strategic threat was not quite 
as immediate as Indian strategists (and many Western observers) had
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thought By 1968-9, when India debated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (and 
decided not to sign it), fear of China had cooled, and Pakistan had re-emerged 
as the most serious security threat The Indian bomb debate has always had 
this peculiar ambivalence in the absence of a clear challenge from one 
neighbor, a threat from the other could instead be invoked
The Pakistani Interpretation
What was not self-evident in 1964-5 was the impact of the extended Indian 
nuclear debate upon Pakistan thinking Completely misjudging the situation, 
many Pakistanis concluded that the Indian bomb debate of 1964 was really 
directed against Pakistan I then had several lengthy conversations with 
Pakistanis responsible for tracking the Indian program They assured me that 
all the talk about Chinese nuclear threats against India was a carefully planted 
Kautilyan deception They were probably reporting the Indian debate in these 
terms
A junior Pakistam minister, Zulfiqar All Bhutto, also saw the Indian debate 
this way His famous we will eat grass statement was made at this time, 
and he was privately urging Ayub Khan to move towards a nuclear program 
Bhutto was also one of the fathers of Pakistan s opemng to China, the 
Pakistams, including Ayub, did not believe that China presented a serious 
threat to India, and therefore Indian appeals to the West and the Soviet 
Union for assistance were really intended to acquire material and political 
support for India s disputes with Pakistan
Ayub dumped Bhutto for many reasons, one of them being his advocacy of a 
weapons program Ayub was still concerned that a Pakistan bomb would 
have— even then—alienated Washington, still Pakistan s major strategic ally 
After the 1965 war Pakistan s strategic environment changed in such a way as 
to suggest a nuclear program, but Bhutto was out of government and no one 
else seems to have taken up the cause
I was m India in 1964-5 and 1968-9, and discussed the nuclear program with 
innumerable Indian officials, experts, journalists, and scholars I cannot recall 
anyone anticipating that the Indian debates over their response to the 
Chinese bomb and to pressures to sign the NPT would significantly affect 
Pakistani nuclear decisions In common with experts elsewhere, few Indians 
took Pakistan s nuclear capabilities (or intentions) seriously Those that did 
were usually dismissed as right-wing Hindu chauvinists
This pattern of underestimation on one side and overestimation on the other 
was to occur again
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JThe 1971 War as a Precipitating Event
The Indo-Pakistan war of 1970-1 precipitated two critical nuclear choices m 
South Asia The first was India's decision to test a nuclear device This was 
determined some time in 1971 by Mrs Gandhi It was not intended to 
produce a device m time to influence the military outcome of the struggle 
over East Pakistan, but it could have been intended to send a signal to the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan, that India was playing for 
keeps—a form of nuclear diplomacy This is an important question, but we 
have little hard information here 4
The actual PNE test did not take place until 1974 By this time Mrs Gandhi 
was in some domestic political difficulty, and final approval for the explosion 
was probably shaped by internal as well as strategic considerations Certainly, 
a new factor was the existence of a bomb design team and an infrastructure to 
support it From about this period one can guess that institutional forces 
(centered around the nuclear scientists) began to generate their own pressure 
As happened in the U S and other nuclear states (and was to occur m 
Pakistan) the fact that a bomb program is underway is a political factor of 
some significance m providing pro-bomb groups with an argument to bring it 
to fruition Few politicians want to be labeled publicly as the man (or 
woman) who shut off work on a vital, prestigious war winner, especially if 
considerable resources have already been sunk into its development This 
institutional momentum has now become a significant force in nuclear 
decisions m Islamabad and Delhi
For Pakistan the loss of East Pakistan was a precipitating nuclear event, but 
there was also a precipitating personality We know now, courtesy of the 
BBC, that immediately upon release from prison Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
assembled a group of advisors and scientists and outlined his plan to build a 
bomb We can only speculate if and when Pakistan would have taken this 
momentous decision if Bhutto had not come to power m 1972 Certainly, 
Ayub, Yahya, and other generals were less than enthusiastic about going 
nuclear before 1972 To some extent this remained true of Bhuttos military 
successors in 1977, but they, too, could not—and perhaps by that time did not 
want to—shut off the nuclear program
The Pakistani Program
Bhutto launched one of history s most successful covert industrial 
operations He was aided by the persistent underestimation of Pakistani 
capabilities by the West and m the freshly-victonous India How could a 
country so soundly defeated aspire to become a nuclear power7 How could a 
leader who seemed so desperate to reach agreement with Mrs Gandhi at the 
Simla Summit—and who so warmly hosted the Janata s Atul Behan 
Vajpayee— be plotting m this way7
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While the Indian program may or may not have been a secret in its early 
stages, there is no question that for Pakistan, whose nuclear infrastructure 
was very small and vulnerable to conventional attack, secrecy was at first 
essential (this may have changed after 1980 or 1981) But slowly, American 
Indian, and other intelligence services became aware of the scope and purpose 
of Pakistani activities While a shroud hangs over the actual pace of the 
program my guess is that by the time of the most sensational exposes of illegal 
purchases it was beyond recall The case of Mr Vaid, and perhaps others, 
were either over-enthusiastic redundant efforts or—more interesting— and 
in keeping with the program s sophistication—deliberate efforts to test the 
reaction of American (and Indian) decision-makers by offering provocative 
public evidence of a Pakistani program If it was the latter than it was a 
success neither country did much to stop or reverse the course of events
Indeed, the whole political side of the Pakistani program was brilliantly 
managed Its survival from Bhutto to Zia (and, evidently, back to another 
Bhutto) is testimony to Pakistani diplomatic skills and a broad-based support 
for the program Pakistanis were driven not only by concern with the Indian 
threat but also by the way m which they see their state as beleaguered, 
isolated, and vulnerable While Pakistan is far more stable and secure now 
than it was in 1977-83, this sense of vulnerability still runs very deep— and 
still cuts across the lines that otherwise separate scientific, political, 
bureaucratic and military groups
III The Present
Technical Capabilities
In a horse race the thing that matters is getting any part of the horse across the 
finish line first Fortunately for India, this does not apply to an arms race 
While Pakistan may have achieved a significant political victory in moving 
faster and farther than anyone expected or predicted, India remains the pre­
eminent nuclear power on the Subcontinent If both countries were to 
militarize their programs India would, after a short time, be able to pull ahead 
with dozens, if not hundreds, of warheads New Delhi possesses a vast 
plutonium mine and the capability of extracting, refining, and shaping this 
hazardous material without outside assistance Pakistan may be somewhere 
in the realm of the four or five weapons that its generals talked about ten 
years ago 5 Then they thought such a number would deter both a nuclear 
threat or conventional onslaught by Delhi Pakistan is also moving slowly to 
acquire a short range missile delivery system, the Indians are close to 
perfecting a number of indigenous missile systems and, if they set their mind 
to it, could develop and acquire a variety of seaborne systems
India s problem is that it is running two arms races, not one The moment it 
acquires dominance over Pakistan it acquires inferiority vis a vis China, the
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Soviet Union, and the United States—and it looses whatever nuclear 
protection it has now by virtue of its non-nuclear status (China has long-since 
announced that it would not use its nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear 
state) The Pakistani program has disrupted Indian strategists precisely 
because it forces the pace of the acquisition of fissile material, design 
technology, reliable command and control systems, missile systems of 
varying range, and perhaps thermonuclear or tactical systems
The Strategic and Military Situation
The frankest statement of current regional nuclear realities I have heard came 
from President Zia ul-Haq 6 Zia described the region as having achieved 
stable nuclear deterrence based upon ambiguity as to whether either India or 
Pakistan had nuclear weapons, and if they did, how many they possessed He 
felt that South Asia would now be crisis stable and that the nuclear deterrent 
would also prevent large-scale conventional war between the two states Zia 
continued his chief concern was about escalation of the nuclear arms race 
m the region, otherwise, India and Pakistan had worked out a satisfactory 
relationship—indeed, they had achieved this m the early 1980s when both 
sides realized they had hostage civilian nuclear plants ^ Zia added that he 
was not particularly concerned about nuclear miscalculation We know what 
the Indians have, and they know us
While Zia offered no pretense of a peaceful Pakistani nuclear program it was 
clear that he at least had thought seriously about South Asia s emerging 
nuclearization He believed that Pakistan s weapons would deter the Indian 
bomb (which many informed Pakistanis claim has existed for at least ten 
years), and would deter an Indian conventional assault In short, Zia and 
other Pakistani strategists believed in extended deterrence based upon what 
could only be a few nuclear devices which might not even be in existence at 
the moment 8 I doubt if they saw any significant strategic use of the bomb to 
the north or the west They relied upon the United States for protection 
when threatened by the Soviets in 1987 (the fact that they had a program 
underway did not significantly influence American calculations, although the 
American response certainly would have been different if Islamabad had 
developed and deployed its own nuclear weapon) While some Pakistanis 
talk of extending a nuclear umbrella over friendly Gulf states, this is more a 
political than a military calculation (which is not to say that some day we may 
not see such deployment)
From Delhi s perspective the strategic situation is somewhat more 
complicated As we noted, India could be running two races at once, entry 
into one compels entry into the other Thus, while time and technology are 
ultimately on New Delhi s side the Pakistani program has forced program 
decisions which should have matured at a more cost-effective pace 9 But the 
decision now seems to be to hold off on an overt weapons program until one
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can be deployed which provides rough parity with China As far as Pakistan 
is concerned, most informed Indians probably share Zia s judgement that 
nuclear stalemate has been reached, and that it was achieved some time ago 
when both sides became aware of the vulnerability of their civilian (and no- 
so-civilian) nuclear installations to conventional attack Delhi s moment of 
truth passed some years ago, m the mid-1970s At that time an attack on 
Pakistan s sole enrichment program would have been devastating and 
effective it would have been just as effective even after the Israeli attack on 
Iraq but the Indians chose to accept the Pakistani program, and blame the U S 
for inaction
To summarize
—Ten years ago Pakistan s nuclear program was militarily but not politically 
vulnerable India s was technically invulnerable, but politically soft India 
could have unilaterally eliminated the Pakistan program without much fuss, 
American efforts to do so by persuasion and threat were ineffective With the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the program acquired an invulnerable 
political shield By the time the Soviets departed it had achieved mature 
technical status
—Had the U S been able to reach an agreement with India on nuclear 
assistance and technology it might have further slowed down Delhi s nuclear 
program It is fortunate (for Delhi, at least) that Washington s effort was 
inept, since nothing short of direct attack or serious regional arms control 
negotiations would have stopped Islamabad from reaching its present 
position Delhi was unwilling to exert either force or diplomacy
—Both programs have passed the point of technical no-retum, both are tied 
together through a series of complex strategic calculations, but neither 
program has yet reached the stage of routine manufacture, deployment, 
development of doctrine and operational strategy, or perfection of command 
and control systems In brief, both countries lack some critical components of 
a military nuclear program These components are human and 
organizational rather than technical and fissile, and for that reason may be 
even harder to bring to that state of reliability which turns a device into a 
weapon
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IV Six Futures The Range of the Possible
Let us now turn to the future(s) Four different projections are based upon 
variations of our discussion of how we got to the present state of affairs m the 
region In addition, there are two wild card developments, which are to 
some degree independent of the processes by which India and Pakistan may 
develop, acquire, and deploy nuclear weapons
Slow Drift to Weapomzation
One regional nuclear future can be deduced by the simple estension of the 
present If current trends continue we can anticipate one regional nuclear 
future the slow drift into de facto weapomzation Past decisions were based 
upon Indian perceptions of a limited threat and Pakistan s perception of a 
massive—but not urgent—threat In both cases decision-makers saw little 
risk m moving further down the nuclear path, m both cases cost constraints 
shaped nuclear programs (mostly by stretching them out), and both sides saw 
their bi-lateral nuclear interactions as under control Pakistan anticipated the 
Indian PNE, India s response to evidence of a Pakistani program was the 
measured expansion of its own infrastructure In both cases there are large 
bureaucracies advocating the expansion of the nuclear programs, and the 
logic of sunk costs provides a powerful argument However, mating 
warheads to missiles is a major technical hump, and it is not likely that either 
side will rush to get over it Thus, if things go on as they have m the past we 
can expect to see small de facto military nuclear systems deployed within 
several years (perhaps without public announcement), we can expect to see 
further technical refinement of warheads (perhaps another peaceful test or 
two, even of a thermonuclear device), and we can expect to see further 
progress m indigenous missile systems Work will also have to begin soon 
on command, control, and communications systems and other arrangements 
for deployment of operational weapons It is also likely that several 
important nuclear decisions will be made in error While both sides pride 
themselves on knowledge of the other, we have seen that their information 
has at times been very bad But, projecting the past into the future, none of 
these erroneous decisions are likely to precipitate a war
Managed Proliferation
If we take the above projection and modify one factor a somewhat different 
future emerges So far Indian and Pakistani choices have been made with 
only partial reference to the actions of the other side (Pakistan s decision to go 
nuclear was made for broader strategic reasons, and under the belief— 
probably correct—that India had decided on a test, it was wrong in that India 
had not decided upon a full-scale nuclear program, India s nuclear decisions 
have always been made with China and superpower nuclear diplomacy in 
mind, not merely m response to events in Pakistan)
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However there are special qualities associated with the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear programs Neither state is tied to a wider alliance system, and no two 
neighboring states anywhere else have ever gone nuclear at the same time 
This suggests the possibility of an increasingly interactive quality to Indian 
and Pakistani nuclear decisions But, given the caution and restraint shown 
by both states over their twenty-five year history of going nuclear it also 
suggests a future m which regional proliferation will take place, but it will 
have a more managed, interactive quality to it than m our first scenario
Arms Racing
If we look elsewhere for insights we encounter plenty of evidence of managed 
proliferation, but there are contrary examples The French, the Israelis, the 
British and the Chinese have been able to keep their programs political and 
limited These states have slowly modernized and improved their own 
arsenals, but for political, not military purposes This hardly characterizes the 
behavior of the two superpowers, driven by the pure, heady logic of nuclear 
deterrence The American experience—particularly that of Dwight 
Eisenhower, who had little regard for nuclear weapons m military terms but 
who wound up authorizing a vast nuclear production capability—is sobering 
Will India and Pakistan be able to resist this logic7 The answer to this 
question will depend upon who is making nuclear decisions in each state 
Will their Albert Wohlstetters and Herman Kahns drive Delhi and Islamabad 
to second-strike stability7 Will their Curtis LeMays or Thomas Powers push 
them to consider pre-emptive strategies7 Or, will both states avoid the 
crushing logic of nuclear deterrence and treat their systems as essentially 
political devices7 Would a vulnerable Indian or Pakistani politician be able 
to resist the combined demands of their generals and hawkish politicians, in 
the context of a nuclear competition, any better than Eisenhower7 Zia had his 
doubts here— I think he was right to be worried
Calculated Restraint
If the logic of nuclear weapons could lead to an arms race (and even if it does 
not, will the cost of a controlled arms race be so great that neither India nor 
Pakistan will easily afford gradual weapomzation), what about the prospects 
for a regional nuclear freeze7 Instead of managing proliferation, could the 
two sides manage a pause in their nuclear programs7
Such a pause could come now, or immediately after the region reached a low 
level of weapomzation, or at some point in between I believe that a regional 
nuclear freeze is technically and politically possible 10 It may be easier to 
bring off once both states have acquired a limited number of nuclear devices 
(but not necessarily assembled ones) Verification would be important, but 
the technologies needed to verify such an agreement now exist Just as 
important would be the strategic and political context of such an agreement
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India cannot accept a bi-lateral arrangement with Pakistan, so China must be 
brought into any negotiations This, in turn, means that the Soviet Union 
and the United States would have to be party to any arrangement, perhaps by 
declaring that South Asia would join those regions (Antarctica, outer space, 
Latin America) to be declared nuclear free zones
Two Additional Futures
It is important to note two other futures which could happen, almost 
independently of the four we have discussed above In my judgement they 
add urgency to the proliferation issue for both regional and extra-regional 
states
Terrorism and Theft can occur on the territory of any state that possesses 
nuclear materials, but they are more likely in states that have not thought 
seriously about the problem Neither India nor Pakistan can impose 
totalitarian-like controls over their nuclear programs, both have disaffected 
ethnic groups, in both—as in the West—there are individuals who see fissile 
material as objects of politics or profit India s problem is compounded by the 
vast size of its nuclear establishment, but reduced, somewhat, by its decision 
to go the plutonium route, Pakistan has apparently produced HEU, a much 
easier material to work with, but this is concentrated m a very few locations 
For both countries the militarization of their nuclear programs will simplify 
control over fissile material (m that finished weapons would presumably be 
placed under military control) but also make such material easier to use, if it 
is in the form of weapons
Proliferation Beyond South Asia is no less a problem for India and Pakistan 
than the rest of the international community Apparently every overt 
nuclear weapons state has helped another state acquire the bomb (the British 
made it easier for the U S  to be the first, the U S later helped the British and 
possibly Israel, the French certainly helped the Israelis, the Soviets provided 
assistance to China, and the Chinese are reported to have helped Pakistan) 
Would India and Pakistan be any different7 If they did plunge into a regional 
arms race this would most certainly be extended to other countries even if 
they were able to manage their own nuclear relationship (or freeze it at 
something like present levels) they could still recover some political and 
economic investments by sharing technology and fissile material with other 
states This process could begin in about three years I use this number 
because it will thake that long for various Middle Eastern countries to 
discover that chemical weapons, the poor man s atomic bomb, are not 
really effective weapons and to resume pursuit of the real thing As for states 
in other regions, their incentive to go nuclear will accelerate if India and 
Pakistan become military nuclear powers
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FOOTNOTES
1 Although this is not an insurmountable problem The writings of Leonard Spector and others 
provide all we need to know about the technical dimensions of the Pakistani and Indian 
programs we have very good knowledge of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia 
because of Rashid Naim s path breaking study Asia s Day After in Stephen P Cohen ed 
The Security of South Asia Asian and American Perspectives (Urbana and Chicago University 
of Illinois Press 1987)
^ Certainly the academic community has been drawn into the blame game and it involves not 
only Indians and Pakistanis but expatnates who are not under pressure to conform distort or 
misrepresent the truth Ironically one of the best treatments of proliferation by a South Asian 
are the writings of Akhtar All a self-employed Pakistani structural engineer with no relevant 
academic credentials
3 It should be read m conjunction with a separate essay Our Bomb and Theirs Reflections on 
McGeorge Bundy s Danger and Survival forthcoming, Swords and Ploughshares University of 
Illinois Program in Arms Control Disarmament and International Security May 1989
4 If the nuclear program was intended to influence the other three governments during the 
conflict by what means did the Indians let them know7 By leaks7 By assuming that their 
intelligence services would detect work on a device7 Through intermediaries7 It is also 
possible that Mrs Gandhi was looking ahead to a post war world in which India would have 
to demonstrate its independence from the Soviets (she had just signed the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship) What better way to do this than to edge towards an independent nuclear 
capability7
5 See Leonard S Spector The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge Ballinger 1988) for estimates of 
present capabilities See also Stephen P Cohen The Pakistan Army (Berkeley University of 
California Press 1984) for a discussion of military attitudes towards nuclear weapons 
However Dr Ashok Kapur claims to have better information about Pakistani army attitudes 
towards nuclear weapons
6 I met with Zia for the last time early in July 1988 in Islamabad We had talked about 
regional proliferation on several earlier occasions For a report of a similar conversation see 
Spector
^ India and Pakistan have (in late 1988) signed an agreement not to attack each other s nuclear 
facilities This actually moves the region towards an agreement of no first use against 
civilian populations since most of these facilities are located in or near major cities No first 
use has its antecedents in the wartime Quebec agreement between the U S and the U K in 
which the two states agreed not to attack each other with nuclear weapons and to consult 
before using nuclear weapons against a third party The agreement lapsed when Britain moved 
to its own nuclear program
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® This is not terribly critical The U S bomb dropped upon Hiroshima was armed in flight the 
design had not even been tested Even today permissive action links mean that many nuclear 
devices are not actually weapons until certain final steps are completed
9 Although of course the pro bomb advocates feel that the Indian program is already years 
behind schedule they have welcomed developments in Pakistan
10 See the discussion in Our Bomb and Theirs The University of Illinois is about to undertake 
a project which (for the first time) will examine the relevance of existing verification 
technologies to several hypothetical regional nuclear arms control agreements
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